Abstract
Quantum neural networks (QNNs) succeed in object recognition, natural language processing, and financial analysis. To maximize the accuracy of a QNN on a Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) computer, approximate synthesis modifies the QNN circuit by reducing error-prone 2-qubit quantum gates. The success of QNNs motivates adversaries to attack QNNs via backdoors. However, na¨ıvely transplanting backdoors designed for classical neural networks to QNNs yields only low attack success rate, due to the noises and approximate synthesis on NISQ computers. Prior quantum circuit-based backdoors cannot selectively attack some inputs or work with all types of encoding layers of a QNN circuit. Moreover, it is easy to detect both transplanted and circuit-based backdoors in a QNN.
In this talk, we introduce a novel and stealthy backdoor attack, QDoor, to achieve high attack success rate in approximately-synthesized QNN circuits by weaponizing unitary differences between uncompiled QNNs and their synthesized counterparts. QDoor trains a QNN behaving normally for all inputs with and without a trigger. However, after approximate synthesis, the QNN circuit always predicts any inputs with a trigger to a predefined class while still acts normally for benign inputs. Compared to prior backdoor attacks, QDoor improves the attack success rate by 13× and the clean data accuracy by 65% on average. Furthermore, prior backdoor detection techniques cannot find QDoor attacks in uncompiled QNN circuits.
Paper Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09529
Learn more about Lei and his work: http://www.jianglei.org/
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